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THE NEW YORKER FACT THE DEAL by SEYMOUR M. HERSH Why is Washington going easy on Pakistan’s nuclear black
marketers? Issue of 2004-03-08 On February 4th, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, who is revered
in Pakistan as the father of the country’s nuclear bomb, appeared on a
state-run television network in Islamabad and confessed that he had been
solely responsible for operating an international black market in
nuclear-weapons materials. His confession was accepted by a stony-faced
Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s President, who is a former Army general, and who
dressed for the occasion in commando fatigues. The next day, on television
again, Musharraf, who claimed to be shocked by Khan’s misdeeds, nonetheless
pardoned him, citing his service to Pakistan (he called Khan “my hero”).
Musharraf told the Times that he had received a
specific accounting of Khan’s activities in Iran, North Korea, and Malaysia
from the United States only last October. “If they knew earlier, they should
have told us,” he said. “Maybe a lot of things would not have happened.” It was a make-believe performance in a make-believe
capital. In interviews last month in Islamabad, a planned city built four
decades ago, politicians, diplomats, and nuclear experts dismissed the Khan
confession and the Musharraf pardon with expressions of scorn and disbelief.
For two decades, journalists and American and European intelligence agencies
have linked Khan and the Pakistani intelligence service, the I.S.I.
(Inter-Service Intelligence), to nuclear-technology transfers, and it was
hard to credit the idea that the government Khan served had been oblivious.
“It is state propaganda,” Samina Ahmed, the director of the Islamabad office
of the International Crisis Group, a nongovernmental organization that
studies conflict resolution, told me. “The deal is that Khan doesn’t tell
what he knows. Everybody is lying. The tragedy of this whole affair is that
it doesn’t serve anybody’s needs.” Mushahid Hussain Sayed, who is a member of
the Pakistani senate, said with a laugh, “America needed an offering to the
gods—blood on the floor. Musharraf told A.Q., ‘Bend over for a spanking.’” A Bush Administration intelligence officer with years of
experience in nonproliferation issues told me last month, “One thing we do
know is that this was not a rogue operation. Suppose Edward Teller had
suddenly decided to spread nuclear technology and equipment around the world.
Do you really think he could do that without the government knowing? How do
you get missiles from North Korea to Pakistan? Do you think A.Q. shipped all
the centrifuges by Federal Express? The military has to be involved, at high
levels.” The intelligence officer went on, “We had every opportunity to put a
stop to the A. Q. Khan network fifteen years ago. Some of those involved
today in the smuggling are the children of those we knew about in the
eighties. It’s the second generation now.” In public, the Bush Administration accepted the pardon
at face value. Within hours of Musharraf’s television appearance, Richard
Armitage, the Deputy Secretary of State, praised him as “the right man at the
right time.” Armitage added that Pakistan had been “very forthright in the
last several years with us about proliferation.” A White House spokesman said
that the Administration valued Musharraf’s assurances that “Pakistan was not
involved in any of the proliferation activity.” A State Department spokesman
said that how to deal with Khan was “a matter for Pakistan to decide.” Musharraf, who seized power in a coup d’état in 1999,
has been a major ally of the Bush Administration in the war on terrorism.
According to past and present military and intelligence officials, however,
Washington’s support for the pardon of Khan was predicated on what Musharraf
has agreed to do next: look the other way as the U.S. hunts for Osama bin
Laden in a tribal area of northwest Pakistan dominated by the forbidding
Hindu Kush mountain range, where he is believed to be operating. American
commanders have been eager for permission to conduct major sweeps in the
Hindu Kush for some time, and Musharraf has repeatedly refused them. Now,
with Musharraf’s agreement, the Administration has authorized a major spring
offensive that will involve the movement of thousands of American troops. Musharraf has proffered other help as well. A former
senior intelligence official said to me, “Musharraf told us, ‘We’ve got guys
inside. The people who provide fresh fruits and vegetables and herd the
goats’” for bin Laden and his Al Qaeda followers. “It’s a quid pro quo: we’re
going to get our troops inside Pakistan in return for not forcing Musharraf
to deal with Khan.”
The spring offensive could diminish the tempo of
American operations in Iraq. “It’s going to be a full-court press,” one
Pentagon planner said. Some of the most highly skilled Special Forces units,
such as Task Force 121, will be shifted from Iraq to Pakistan. Special Forces
personnel around the world have been briefed on their new assignments, one
military adviser told me, and in some cases have been given “warning
orders”—the stage before being sent into combat. A large-scale American military presence in Pakistan
could also create an uproar in the country and weaken Musharraf’s already
tenuous hold on power. The operation represents a tremendous gamble for him
personally (he narrowly survived two assassination attempts in December) and,
by extension, for the Bush Administration—if he fell, his successor might be
far less friendly to the United States. One of Musharraf’s most vocal critics
inside Pakistan is retired Army Lieutenant General Hamid Gul, a
fundamentalist Muslim who directed the I.S.I. from 1987 to 1989, at the height
of the Afghan war with the Soviets. If American troops start operating from
Pakistan, there will be “a rupture in the relationship,” Gul told me.
“Americans think others are slaves to them.” Referring to the furor over A.
Q. Khan, he added, “We may be in a jam, but we are a very honorable nation.
We will not allow the American troops to come here. This will be the breaking
point.” If Musharraf has made an agreement about letting American troops
operate in Pakistan, Gul said, “he’s lying to you.” The greatest risk may be not to Musharraf, or to the
stability of South Asia, but to the ability of the international nuclear
monitoring institutions to do their work. Many experts fear that, with Khan’s
help, the world has moved closer to a nuclear tipping point. Husain Haqqani,
who was a special assistant to three prime ministers before Musharraf came to
power and is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, noted, with some pride, that his nation had managed to make the bomb
despite American sanctions. But now, he told me, Khan and his colleagues have
gone wholesale: “Once they had the bomb, they had a shopping list of what to
buy and where. A. Q. Khan can bring a plain piece of paper and show me how to
get it done—the countries, people, and telephone numbers. ‘This is the guy in
Russia who can get you small quantities of enriched uranium. You in Malaysia
will manufacture the stuff. Here’s who will miniaturize the warhead. And then
go to North Korea and get the damn missile.’” He added, “This is not a few
scientists pocketing money and getting rich. It’s a state policy.” Haqqani depicted Musharraf as truly “on the American
side,” in terms of resisting Islamic extremism, but, he said, “he doesn’t
know how to be on the American side. The same guys
in the I.S.I. who have done this in the last twenty years he expects to be
his partners. These are people who’ve done nothing but covert operations:
One, screw India. Two, deceive America. Three, expand Pakistan’s influence in
the Islamic community. And, four, continue to spread nuclear technology.” He
paused. “Musharraf is trying to put out the fire with the help of the people
who started the fire,” he said. “Much of this has been known for decades to the American
intelligence community,” Haqqani added. “Sometimes you know things and don’t
want to do anything about it. Americans need to know that your government is
not only downplaying this but covering it up. You go to bed with our I.S.I.
They know how to suck up to you. You let us get away with everything. Why
can’t you be more honest? There’s no harm in telling us the truth—‘Look,
you’re an ally but a very disturbing ally.’ You have to nip some of these
things in the bud.” The former senior American intelligence official was
equally blunt. He told me, “Khan was willing to sell blueprints, centrifuges,
and the latest in weaponry. He was the worst nuclear-arms proliferator in the
world and he’s pardoned—with not a squeak from the White House.”
The most recent revelations about the nuclear black
market were triggered by the National Council of Resistance of Iran, a now
defunct opposition group that has served as the political wing of the
People’s Mujahideen Khalq, a group that has been on the State Department’s
list of terrorist organizations since 1997. The National Council lobbied in
Washington for decades, and offered information—not always accurate—about
Iran. There had been suspicions about Iran’s nuclear intentions since the
eighties, but the country’s religious rulers claimed that its nuclear
facilities were intended for peaceful purposes only. In August of 2002, the
National Council came up with something new: it announced at a news
conference in Washington that it had evidence showing that Iran had secretly
constructed two extensive nuclear-weapons facilities in the desert south of
Tehran. The two plants were described with impressive specificity. One, near
Natanz, had been depicted by Iranian officials as part of a
desert-eradication program. The site, surrounded by barbed wire, was said to
include two work areas buried twenty-five feet underground and ringed by
concrete walls more than eight feet thick. The second plant, which was said
to be producing heavy water for use in making weapons-grade plutonium, was
situated in Arak and ostensibly operated as an energy company. Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency,
the organization that monitors nuclear proliferation, eventually followed up
on the National Council’s information. And it checked out. A building that I.A.E.A. inspectors were not able to
gain full access to on a visit in March, 2003, was found on a subsequent trip
to contain a centrifuge facility behind a wall made of boxes. Inspectors
later determined that some of the centrifuges had been supplied by Pakistan.
They also found traces of highly enriched uranium on centrifuge components
manufactured in Iran and Pakistan. The I.A.E.A. has yet to determine whether
the uranium originated in Pakistan: the enriched materials could have come
from the black market, or from a nuclear proliferator yet to be discovered,
or from the Iranians’ own production facilities. Last October, the Iranian government, after nine months
of denials and obfuscation—and increasingly productive inspections—formally
acknowledged to the I.A.E.A. that it had secretly been producing small
quantities of enriched uranium and plutonium, and had been operating a pilot
heavy-water reactor program, all potentially in violation of its obligations
under the nuclear-nonproliferation treaty. Some of the secret programs, Iran
admitted, dated back eighteen years. At first, the country’s religious
leadership claimed that its scientists had worked on their own, and not with
the help of outside suppliers. The ayatollahs later admitted that this was
not the case, but refused to say where the help had come from. Iran’s leaders continued to insist that their goal was
to produce nuclear energy, not nuclear weapons, and, in a public report last
November, the I.A.E.A. stopped short of accusing them of building a bomb.
Cautiously, it stated, “It is clear that Iran has failed in a number of
instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations . . . with
respect to the reporting of nuclear material and its processing and use. . .
. To date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear
material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons
programme.” Privately, however, senior proliferation experts were
far less reserved. “I know what they did,” one official in Vienna told me,
speaking of the Iranians. “They’ve been lying all the time and they’ve been
cheating all the time.” Asked if he thought that Iran now has the bomb, the
official said no. Asked if he thought that Iran had enough enriched uranium
to make a bomb, he said, “I’m not sure.”
Musharraf has insisted that any dealings between A. Q.
Khan and Iran were independent of, and unknown to, the Pakistani government.
But there is evidence to contradict him. On a trip to the Middle East last
month, I was told that a number of years ago the Israeli signals-intelligence
agency, known as Unit 8200, broke a sophisticated Iranian code and began
monitoring communications that included talk between Iran and Pakistan about
Iran’s burgeoning nuclear-weapons program. The Israeli intelligence community
has many covert contacts inside Iran, stemming from the strong ties it had there
before the overthrow of the Shah, in 1979; some of these ties still exist.
Israeli intelligence also maintained close contact with many Iranian
opposition groups, such as the National Council. A connection was
made—directly or indirectly—and the Israeli intelligence about Iran’s nuclear
program reached the National Council. A senior I.A.E.A. official subsequently
told me that he knew that the Council’s information had originated with
Israeli intelligence, but he refused to say where he had learned that fact.
(An Israeli diplomat in Washington, asked to comment, said, “Why would we
work with a Mickey Mouse outlet like the Council?”) The Israeli intercepts have been shared, in some form,
with the United States intelligence community, according to the former senior
intelligence official, and they show that high-level officials in Islamabad
and Tehran had frequent conversations about the I.A.E.A. investigation and
its implications. “The interpretation is the issue here,” the former official
said. “If you set the buzzwords aside, the substance is that the Iranians
were saying, ‘We’ve got to play with the I.A.E.A. We don’t want to blow our
cover, but we have to show some movement. There’s no way we’re going against
world public opinion—no way. We’ve got to show that we’re coöperating and get
the Europeans on our side.’” (At the time, Iran was engaged in negotiations
with the European Union on trade and other issues.) It’s clear from the
intercepts, however, the former intelligence official said, that Iran did not
want to give up its nuclear potential. The Pakistani response, he added, was
“Don’t give away the whole ballgame and we’ll look out for you.” There was a
further message from Pakistan, the former official said: “Look out for your
own interests.” In the official’s opinion, Pakistan and Iran have
survived the crisis: “They both did what they said they’d do, and neither one
has been hurt. No one has been damaged. The public story is still that Iran
never really got there—which is bullshit.” And analysts throughout the
American intelligence community, he said, are asking, “How could it be that
Pakistan’s done all these things—developed a second generation of
miniaturized and boosted weapons—and yet the investigation has been shorted
to ground?” A high-level intelligence officer who has access to the
secret Iran-Pakistan exchanges told me that he understood that “the
Pakistanis were very worried that the Iranians would give their name to the
I.A.E.A.” The officer, interviewed in Tel Aviv, told me that Israel remains
convinced that “the Iranians do not intend to give up the bomb. What Iran did
was report to the I.A.E.A. the information that was already out in the open
and which they cannot protect. There is much that is not exposed.” Israeli
intelligence, he added, continues to see digging and other nuclear-related
underground activity in Iran. A nonproliferation official based in Vienna
later explained that Iran has bored two holes near a uranium-mining operation
that are “deep enough to do a test”—as deep as two hundred metres. The design
of the bomb that could be tested, he added, if Iran chose to do so, came from
Libya, via Pakistan and A. Q. Khan.
Last December, President Bush and Tony Blair, the
British Prime Minister, jointly announced that Muammar Qaddafi, the Libyan
leader, had decided to give up his nuclear-weapons program and would permit
I.A.E.A. inspectors to enter his country. The surprise announcement, the
culmination of nine months of secret talks, was followed immediately by a
six-day inspection by the I.A.E.A., the first of many inspections, and the
public unveiling, early this year, of the role of yet another country,
Malaysia, in the nuclear black market. Libya had been able to purchase
hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of nuclear parts, including advanced
centrifuges designed in Pakistan, from a firm in Malaysia, with a free-trade
zone in Dubai serving as the main shipping point. It was a new development in
an old arms race: Malaysia, a high-tech nation with no indigenous nuclear
ambitions, was retailing sophisticated nuclear gear, based on designs made
available by Khan. The centrifuge materials that the inspectors found in
Libya had not been assembled—in most cases, in fact, the goods were still in
their shipping cases. “I am not impressed by what I’ve seen,” a senior
nonproliferation official told me. “It was not a well-developed program—not a
serious research-and-development approach to make use of what they bought. It
was useless. But I was absolutely struck by what the Libyans were able to
buy. What’s on the market is absolutely horrendous. It’s a Mafia-type
business, with corruption and secrecy.” I.A.E.A. inspectors, to their dismay, even found in
Libya precise blueprints for the design and construction of a half-ton
nuclear weapon. “It’s a sweet little bomb, put together by engineers who know
how to assemble a weapon,” an official in Vienna told me. “No question it’ll
work. Just dig a hole and test it. It’s too big and too heavy for a Scud, but
it’ll go into a family car. It’s a terrorist’s dream.” In a speech on February 5th at Georgetown University,
George Tenet, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, hailed the
developments in Libya as an American intelligence coup. Tenet said, “We
learned of all this through the powerful combination of technical
intelligence, careful and painstaking analytic work, operational daring, and,
yes, the classic kind of human intelligence that people have led you to
believe we no longer have.” The C.I.A. unquestionably has many highly
motivated and highly skilled agents. But interviews with former C.I.A.
officials and with two men who worked closely with Libyan intelligence
present a different story. Qaddafi had been seeking a reconciliation with the West
for years, with limited success. Then, a former C.I.A. operations officer
told me, Musa Kusa, the longtime head of Libyan intelligence, urged Qaddafi
to meet with Western intelligence agencies and open up his weapons arsenal to
international inspection. The C.I.A. man quoted Kusa as explaining that, as
the war with Iraq drew near, he had warned Qaddafi, “You are nuts if you
think you can defeat the United States. Get out of it now. Surrender now and
hope they accept your surrender.” One Arab intelligence operative told me that Libyan
intelligence, with Qaddafi’s approval, then quickly offered to give American
and British intelligence details about a centrifuge deal that was already
under way. The parts were due to be shipped aboard a German freighter, the
B.B.C. China. In October, the freighter was seized, and the incident was
proclaimed a major intelligence success. But, the operative said, it was “the
Libyans who blew up the Pakistanis,” and who made the role of Khan’s black
market known. The Americans, he said, asked “questions about those orders and
Libya said it had them.” It was, in essence, a sting, and was perceived that
way by Musharraf. He was enraged by what he called, in a nationally televised
speech last month—delivered in Urdu, and not officially translated by the
Pakistani government—the betrayal of Pakistan by his “Muslim brothers” in
both Libya and Iran. There was little loyalty between seller and buyer. “The
Pakistanis took a lot of Libya’s money and gave second-grade plans,” the Arab
intelligence operative said. “It was halfhearted.” The intelligence operative went on, “Qaddafi is very
pragmatic and studied the timing. It was the right time. The United States
wanted to have a success story, and he banked on that.”
Because of the ongoing investigation into Khan and his
nuclear-proliferation activities, the I.A.E.A.’s visibility and credibility
have grown.The key issue, Mohamed ElBaradei, the director-general of the
I.A.E.A., told me, in an interview at the organization’s headquarters in
Vienna, is non-state actors. “I have a nightmare that the spread of enriched
uranium and nuclear material could result in the operation of a small
enrichment facility in a place like northern Afghanistan,” he said. “Who
knows? It’s not hard for a non-state to hide, especially if there is a state
in collusion with it. Some of these non-state groups are very sophisticated.” Many diplomats in Vienna expressed frustration at the
I.A.E.A.’s inability, thanks to Musharraf’s pardon, to gain access to Khan.
“It’s not going to happen,” one diplomat said. “We are getting some
coöperation from Pakistan, but it’s the names we
need to know. ‘Who got the stuff?’ We’re interested to know whether other
nations that we’re supposed to supervise have the stuff.” The diplomat told
me he believed that the United States was unwilling to publicly state the
obvious: that there was no way the Pakistani government didn’t know about the
transfers. He said, “Of course it looks awful, but Musharraf will be indebted
to you.” The I.A.E.A.’s authority to conduct inspections is
limited. The nations that have signed the nonproliferation treaty are
required to permit systematic I.A.E.A. inspections of their declared nuclear
facilities for research and energy production. But there is no mechanism for
the inspection of suspected nuclear-weapons sites, and many at the I.A.E.A.
believe that the treaty must be modified. “There is a nuclear network of
black-market centrifuges and weapons design that the world has yet to
discover,” a diplomat in Vienna told me. In the past, he said, the I.A.E.A.
had worked under the assumption that nations would cheat on the nonproliferation
treaty “to produce and sell their own nuclear material.” He said, “What we
have instead is a black-market network capable of producing usable nuclear
materials and nuclear devices that is not limited to any one nation. We have
nuclear dealers operating outside our front door, and we have no control over
them—no matter how good we are in terms of verification.” There would be no
need, in other words, for A. Q. Khan or anyone else in Pakistan to have a
direct role in supplying nuclear technology. The most sensitive nuclear
equipment would be available to any country—or any person or group,
presumably—that had enough cash. “This is a question of survival,” the diplomat said,
with a caustic smile. He added, “Iraq is laughable in comparison with this
issue. The Bush Administration was hunting the shadows instead of the prey.” Another nonproliferation official depicted the challenge
facing the I.A.E.A. inspection regime as “a seismic shift—the globalization
of the nuclear world.” The official said, “We have to move from inspecting
declared sites to ‘Where does this shit come from?’ If we stay focussed on
the declared, we miss the nuclear supply matrix.” At this point, the
international official asked me, in all seriousness, “Why hasn’t A. Q. Khan
been taken out by Israel or the United States?”
After Pakistan’s role in providing nuclear aid to Iran
and Libya was revealed, Musharraf insisted once again, this time at the World
Economic Forum, in Davos, Switzerland, in January, that he would not permit
American troops to search for Al Qaeda members inside Pakistan. “That is not
a possibility at all,” he said. “It is a very sensitive issue. There is no
room for any foreign elements coming and assisting us. We don’t need any
assistance.” Nonetheless, a senior Pentagon adviser told me in
mid-February, the spring offensive is on. “We’re entering a huge period of
transition in Iraq,” the adviser said, referring to the coming changeover of
forces, with many of the experienced regular Army combat units being replaced
by National Guard and Army Reserve units. “We will not be conducting a lot of
ops, and so you redirect and exploit somewhere else.” The operation, American officials said, is scheduled to
involve the redeployment to South Asia of thousands of American soldiers,
including members of Task Force 121. The logistical buildup began in
mid-February, as more than a dozen American C-17 cargo planes began daily
flights, hauling helicopters, vehicles, and other equipment to military bases
in Pakistan. Small teams of American Special Forces units have been stationed
at the Shahbaz airbase, in northwestern Pakistan, since the beginning of the
Afghanistan war, in the fall of 2001. The senior Pentagon adviser, like other military and
intelligence officials I talked to, was cautious about the chances of getting
what the White House wants—Osama bin Laden. “It’s anybody’s guess,” he said,
adding that Ops Sec—operational security—for the planned offensive was poor.
The former senior intelligence official similarly noted that there was
concern inside the Joint Special Operations Command, at Fort Bragg, North
Carolina, over the reliability of intercepted Al Qaeda telephone calls. “What
about deception?” he said. “These guys are not dumb, and once the logistical
aircraft begin to appear”—the American C-17s landing every night at an
airbase in Pakistan—“you know something is going on.” “We’ve got to get Osama bin Laden, and we know where he
is,” the former senior intelligence official said. Osama bin Laden is
“communicating through sigint”—talking on
satellite telephones and the like—“and his wings have been clipped. He’s in
his own Alamo in northern Pakistan. It’s a natural progress—whittling down
alternative locations and then targeting him. This is not, in theory, a
‘Let’s go and hope’ kind of thing. They’ve seen what they think is him.” But
the former official added that there were reasons to be cautious about such
reports, especially given that bin Laden hasn’t been seen for so long. Bin
Laden would stand out because of his height; he is six feet five. But the
target area is adjacent to Swat Valley, which is populated by a tribe of
exceptionally tall people. Two former C.I.A. operatives with firsthand knowledge of
the PakistanAfghanistan border areas said that the American assault, if it
did take place, would confront enormous logistical problems. “It’s
impenetrable,” said Robert Baer, who visited the Hindu Kush area in the early
nineties, before he was assigned to lead the C.I.A.’s anti-Saddam operations
in northern Iraq. “There are no roads, and you can’t get armor up there. This
is where Alexander the Great lost an entire division. The Russians didn’t
even bother to go up there. Everybody’s got a gun. That area is worse than
Iraq.” Milton Bearden, who ran the C.I.A.’s operations in Afghanistan during
the war with the Soviet Union, recounted, “I’ve been all through there. The
Pashtun population in that belt has lived there longer than almost any other ethnic
group has lived anywhere on earth.” He said, “Our intelligence has got to be
better than it’s been. Anytime we go into something driven entirely by
electoral politics, it doesn’t work out.” One American intelligence consultant noted that American
forces in Afghanistan have crossed into Pakistan in “hot pursuit” of Al Qaeda
suspects in previous operations, with no complaints from the Pakistani
leadership. If the American forces strike quickly and decisively against bin
Laden from within Pakistan, he added, “Musharraf could say he gave no advance
authorization. We can move in with so much force and firepower—with so much
shock and awe—that we will be too fast for him.” The consultant said, “The
question is, how deep into Pakistan can we pursue him?” He added, “Musharraf
is in a very tough position.” At home, Musharraf is in more danger than ever over his
handling of the nuclear affair. “He’s opened up Pandora’s box, and he will
never be able to manage it,” Chaudry Nisar Ali Khan, a former government minister
who now heads an opposition party, said. “Pakistani public opinion feels that
A.Q. has been made a scapegoat, and international opinion thinks he’s a
threat. This is a no-win situation for Musharraf. The average man feels that
there will be a nuclear rollback, and Pakistan’s immediate deterrent will be
taken away. It comes down to an absolute disaster for Musharraf.” Robert Gallucci, a former United Nations weapons
inspector who is now dean of the Georgetown University School of Foreign
Service, calls A. Q. Khan “the Johnny Appleseed” of the nuclear-arms race.
Gallucci, who is a consultant to the C.I.A. on proliferation issues, told me,
“Bad as it is with Iran, North Korea, and Libya having nuclear-weapons
material, the worst part is that they could transfer it to a non-state group.
That’s the biggest concern, and the scariest thing about all this—that
Pakistan could work with the worst terrorist groups on earth to build nuclear
weapons. There’s nothing more important than stopping terrorist groups from getting
nuclear weapons. The most dangerous country for the United States now is
Pakistan, and second is Iran.” Gallucci went on, “We haven’t been this
vulnerable since the British burned Washington in 1814.”
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